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Introduction  
  
This chapter has two aims. The first is to explain how ethnographic enquiry can be 
strengthened through recourse to the ontological assumptions of critical realism. The 
second is to look in the other direction and show how critical realist researchers might 
benefit from utilizing ethnography as a means of initiating the ‘retroductive journey’. 
We thus argue that critical realism and ethnography can have a mutually beneficial 
relationship. We provide a broad overview of the core tenets of ethnography, consider 
how particular developments in the ethnographic tradition – from phenomenology and 
postmodernism – have challenged some of its founding principles, argue that 
ethnography now needs to find a way to deal more adequately with social structure, and 
suggest that critical realism offers a fruitful way forward in this respect.  
Our contention is that ethnography is most usefully seen not merely as a method 
of data collection but rather as a sociological practice. This involves linking rich 
individual ethnographic accounts to various layers of context and social structure, and 
attempting to explain rather than merely describe social phenomena (Watson 2012). 
Seen in this way, the well-established core principle of ethnography – to ‘get inside the 
heads’ of individuals and their ‘subjective understandings’ – is insufficient. Rather, 
ethnography must reveal the links between these subjective understandings and their 
structural social origins. We believe critical realism is well equipped to provide this 
‘connective tissue’, and we illustrate this with reference to the study of work and 
organizations. Ethnography remains crucial for exploring and explaining the world of 
work, whilst critical realism offers a robust philosophical grounding for ethnographic 
enquiry.  
 
Developments in the ethnographic tradition 
 
The term ethnography has been used since the early nineteenth century to describe 
some manner of anthropological investigation, but it was during the last century that it 
gained far wider currency in social science. It can be defined as ‘a family of methods 
involving direct and sustained social contact with agents, and of richly writing up the 
encounter, respecting, recording, representing at least partly in its own terms, the 
irreducibility of human experience’ (Willis and Trondman 2000: 5). It is a research 
process based on fieldwork using observational diaries and the collection of cultural 
artefacts. The eventual written product – an ethnography – draws primarily from 
fieldwork experience, and consequently emphasizes descriptive detail (Davies 2008). 
 The roots of ethnography are usually traced to European cultural anthropology. 
During a period of rapid ‘New World’ colonization, ethnography, as the study of race 
and comparative human culture, became part of a colonial enterprise of travel, 
exploration and record-keeping. In a world without Google Earth, 24-hour TV news and 
geography teachers, there was no easy way to find out about non-industrialized 
societies, so the obvious approach for those with time and resources was to visit first-
hand and personally document what it was like. ‘Document’ meant using whatever 
technological tools were available at the time, which in the 1910s and 1920s included 
pen and paper, early photographic equipment, and perhaps a phonograph sound 
recording device. The first person to elaborately describe the method of ethnography 
was Bronislaw Malinowski, a Polish-born anthropologist affiliated with the London 
School of Economics between 1910 and 1930. His detailed study of New Guinea, 
published in Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), gave him the title of ‘father of 
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social anthropology’ among many commentators. Malinowski was influential for 
conducting a lengthy period of fieldwork, writing up detailed cultural descriptions along 
with theoretical generalizations and, most importantly, including extensive reflections 
on his methodological experience and tactics.  
 Early ethnographers like Malinowski offered little reflection on or sensitivity to 
their philosophical beliefs. We might describe them as ‘naive realists’ who considered 
immediate sensory experience as enough to precisely record the truth – after all, seeing 
is believing – and indeed there remained much anti-philosophical empiricist thinking in 
ethnographic literature until relatively recently (Hammersley 1992). If Malinowski 
provided the foundations of ethnography, it was the Chicago School of sociology, under 
the leadership of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, that re-energized the approach to 
study ‘society as it is’ (Park and Burgess 1921: 210) within the context of industrialized 
societies. The Chicago School was hugely influential in the early twentieth century, by 
some approximations training over half of all sociologists in the world by 1930. A 
hugely productive period of ethnographic work followed, with studies of slums, 
brothels, communities, professions, and later workplaces. The Chicago researchers, like 
the early anthropologists, did not propose any systematic philosophy of social science, 
but they did develop an approach that placed sociology (a relatively young field at the 
time) at the theoretical and empirical centre, locating an open relational understanding 
of society at the core of social science. It was obvious to the Chicago researchers that 
‘good social science’ required getting outside and seeing the world, and they contrasted 
what they saw as this courageous enterprise with others who sat in their armchairs 
quantifying the world by manipulating an arbitrary mix of variables or producing 
philosophical categories without empirical insights.  
 Despite the fact that intimacy with local space and time was necessary and 
straightforward to the Chicago researchers, this perspective became oddly lost in 
subsequent ethnographic reportage (Van Maanen 2011). More recent developments 
moved ethnography away from the confident approach of its originators, and in so 
doing threatened to undermine its credibility. In a recent overview of the broad 
applications of ethnography, Davies (2008: ix) suggests that it has in many respects 
become ‘scarcely more than a legitimizing label for activities that bear little relation to 
… ethnographic research … as it is understood in the discipline in which it was first 
developed’. In particular, we can identify how the combined influence of two significant 
strands of work – firstly phenomenology and, more recently, the so-called 
‘postmodernist turn’ – has led to ‘the erasure of structure from the ethnographic 
imagination’ (Porter 2002: 53). Following Porter, we contend that a solution to this 
impasse is offered by critical realism, in that it grounds ethnographic enquiry within a 
robust and convincing conception of social structure.  
Phenomenology gives primacy to the idea of a socially constructed reality 
created through interaction among people, who use symbols to interpret one another 
and assign meaning to perceptions and experiences. It is the study of what Alfred Schutz 
(1973) called the ‘life-world’, consisting of the taken-for-granted stream of everyday 
routines, interactions and events. In essence, the significance of Schutz’s ideas for 
ethnographic sociological research lay in encouraging ethnographers to rely exclusively 
on uncovering the subjective interpretations of individuals without paying attention to 
how social structures and processes influenced those interpretations. As Porter (1993, 
2002) explains, this emphasized the subjective at the cost of recognition of the causal 
effects of the wider social world upon the subjectivities of individuals. Smith and Elger 
(2013, this volume) remind us that social structures such as class, gender and race have 
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causal powers over such things as resource allocation, privileging and punishing people 
in ways that they do not alone determine. Micro-level ethnography on its own is thus 
insufficient, and purely interpretive accounts of social action are inadequate for 
generating a full understanding of the reality of social phenomena.  
Porter cites an example of an ethnographic study informed by the 
phenomenological standpoint, namely Hockey’s (1986) study of British soldiers on 
combat duty in rural Ireland, which, in good ethnographic tradition, described their 
everyday lives in rich detail, but stopped short of asking why the soldiers were acting in 
the way they were (and thus included no consideration of how political, social and 
economic relations between Ireland and Britain have been historically structured). As 
Porter puts it, the problem here is that ‘the restriction of the interpretation of behaviour 
to the subjectively intended meanings that immediately generated it obviates the 
possibility of deeper analysis of the social situation encountered by the ethnographer ... 
While understanding the interpretations of the social actors is a necessary condition for 
sociological knowledge, it is not a sufficient one’ (2002: 57). If ethnography is to be an 
effective method of social research it therefore needs to be grounded in an ontological, 
epistemological and methodological position that can provide a deeper understanding 
than subjectivism is capable of, one which is able to link the subjective understandings 
of individuals with the structural positions within which those individuals are located. 
Critical realism offers such a position. 
 A second direction which ethnography has taken in recent years was influenced 
strongly by the postmodernist philosophy of science. This arose from a critique of the 
classic tradition of anthropology in which the ethnographer is in a position of authority, 
with the Western researcher presuming to explain various non-Western cultures 
according to his or her own preconceptions. The critique of the construction of the non-
Western ‘other’ within this paradigm led many to radically question the authority of the 
ethnographic author, and here we see what Porter calls ‘a full swing across the 
spectrum of epistemological confidence – from the point where ethnographers assume 
unproblematically the validity of their authorial position, to the point where 
ethnographies are seen as nothing more than the inventions of their authors’ (2002: 
58). Postmodernism allows us little or no confidence to assume that one interpretation 
of the social world can claim epistemological superiority over any other. As Porter 
points out: ‘The difficulty with such a position is that, if ethnographies are simply 
authorial inventions, rather than reflections, of greater or lesser accuracy, of social 
reality, then what is the point of ethnography? … If absolute uncertainty and relativism 
are accepted, there is little else for ethnographers to say about the social world, for what 
they say can claim no superiority in terms of adequacy over that which anyone else 
says’. (2002: 59) 
Although each is problematic, we would not contend that the phenomenological and 
postmodernist critiques of ethnography can be easily dismissed. As Porter (2002) 
acknowledges, phenomenology reminds us of the importance of understanding 
subjective meanings as the basis of social action, and postmodernism makes us aware of 
the dangers of making absolute claims about those understandings. On the latter, Davies 
(2008) suggests that ethnographers should ‘utilise creatively the insights of … 
postmodernist perspectives – insights that encourage incorporation of different 
standpoints, exposure of the intellectual tyranny of meta-narratives and recognition of 
the authority that adheres in the authorial voice – while at the same time rejecting the 
extreme pessimism of their epistemological critiques’ (2008: 5-6). In other words, 
ethnography needs to ‘incorporate these insights, while at the same time going beyond 
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them, in order to take into account the patterning of social behaviour’ (Porter 2002: 59). 
And this is where critical realism comes in. An adequate philosophical underpinning to 
ethnographic enquiry must be one which ‘accepts that there is a reality beyond 
individuals, but which does not over-extend its claims about how much we can know 
about that reality (in response to postmodernism) or about the degree to which 
external reality controls the decisions of individuals (in response to phenomenology)’ 
(Porter 2002: 60). Effective ethnographic research ‘requires both an ontology that 
asserts that there is a social world independent of our knowledge of it and an 
epistemology that argues that it is knowable’ (Davies 2008: 18). Critical realism 
provides a philosophical basis for such an integrative position. 
 
Critical realism and ethnography  
 
We have suggested that ethnography should avoid being diverted from studying the 
connection between the actions of people in social settings and the social, economic and 
political structures within which those actions occur. In this we echo Watson’s (2011) 
view that the behaviourist and psychological uses of ethnography simply to tell ‘stories’ 
and describe individuals’ feelings are insufficient. As Davies (2008) argues, we can 
neither take behavioural observations as simply representative of some given social 
world nor fully reveal or reconstruct the social through our understanding of actors’ 
meanings and beliefs. Rather, explaining observable events requires a consideration of 
the conditions that enabled these events, and she quotes Margaret Archer on this point: 
‘Observing a cherry tree in England depends on its prior importation from China, just as 
experiencing educational discrimination is posterior to a given definition of 
achievement being institutionalized’ (Archer 1998: 196, quoted in Davies 2008). This 
introduces a necessary historicity into explanation, along with recognition of the 
layering of social phenomena.  
Since chapter 1 of this volume provides a full outline of the core principles of 
critical realism, we stress here only those aspects of the realist position which are 
relevant to its potential as an effective ‘under-labourer’ to ethnographic enquiry. It is 
clear that critical realism takes a stance against both positivism, on the one hand, and 
relativist approaches such as constructivism and postmodernism, on the other. With 
regards to postmodernism, we need only note that once particular ‘agential discourses’ 
become the objective elements of social structure, through a process of 
institutionalization across time and space, they are then ontologically prior to individual 
human agency, and therefore constrain its capacity to change the underlying conditions 
of action. As Searle (1995: 190) powerfully observes, ‘we do not “create” social 
structure, we reproduce and transform it’, and as such ‘a socially constructed reality 
presupposes a non-socially constructed reality’. 
This brings us to the heart of what critical realism offers to ethnography. 
Crucially, it holds to the existence of underlying structures and mechanisms. Human 
action is conceived as both enabled and constrained by social structures, but this action 
in turn reproduces or transforms those structures (Leca and Naccache 2006). Critical 
realism thus offers a meta-theoretical paradigm for explaining the underlying 
‘generative mechanisms’ that shape human agency and the social relations that this 
agency in turn reproduces and transforms (Reed 2005). Importantly, pre-existing 
material and social structures are considered to have an independent ontological status 
irrespective of their recognition by social actors, causality referring to the inherent 
powers or capacities of mechanisms or structures to generate tendencies or regularities 
6 
 
which may or may not be contingently observed in empirical events or outcomes 
(Collier 1994; Danermark et al. 2002). However, whilst deep structures and generative 
mechanisms are not readily apparent, they can be observed and experienced through 
their effects. Accordingly, the objects of social research are those ‘persistent relations 
between individuals and groups, and … the relations between these relations. Relations 
such as between capitalist and worker, MP and constituent, student and teacher, 
husband and wife‘ (Bhaskar 1989: 71). And it is these relations that ethnographic 
research is particularly well-suited to examine. 
Considering generative mechanisms as ‘tendencies’ with sets of ‘potentials’ that 
may or may not be realized draws our attention to the indeterminacy of causal powers. 
Rules, norms and institutions develop logics independent of the choices of individual 
actors, and causal powers are not necessarily activated. It is thus the task of social 
science to establish the necessary structural conditions given for conscious human 
activity. This is the ‘transcendental question’ (Banfield 2004). As Davies notes, critical 
realism thus proposes a subtle and complex view of society in which human agents are 
neither passive products of social structures nor entirely their creators, but rather are 
‘placed in an iterative and naturally reflexive feedback relationship to them’ (2008: 26). 
Ethnographic writing involves the adoption of intensive field-research observational 
practices, and a critical realist ethnography would seek to provide a grounded and 
contextualized account of ‘how the social world works’ (Watson 2011), setting out from 
the premise that subjects’ own accounts are the starting point, but not the end, of the 
research process. A critical realist ethnography would aim not only to describe events 
but also to explain them, by identifying the influence of structural factors on human 
agency. Specifically, its objective would be to elucidate the specific, contingent manner 
in which a certain mix of causal powers has been formed and activated. 
 
Implications for method 
 
Having considered, in principle, what critical realism can offer in terms of a robust 
philosophical underpinning to ethnography, what does a realist basis for ethnography 
entail in methodological terms? Given that critical realism assumes necessary and 
contingent relations among objects, its methodological goals are primarily descriptive 
and explanatory (Morais 2011). Causal explanation requires ‘finding or imagining 
plausible generative mechanisms for the patterns amongst events’ (Harré 1975: 125), 
leading to ‘the postulation of a possible mechanism, the attempt to collect evidence for 
or against its existence, and the elimination of possible alternatives’ (Outhwaite 1987: 
58). A critical realist explanation will thus involve a gradual transition ‘from actions 
through reasons to rules and thence to structures’ (Sayer 1992: 112). Beginning with 
actions, these constitute the phenomena under study, presupposing conditions in terms 
of which reasons are formulated. Reasons, in turn, are inferred from actors’ accounts as 
to why the actions have taken place. Such reasons are made intelligible in terms of the 
rules they invoke, through the identification of structures or objects responsible for 
such rules. As Morais (2011) explains, a critical realist explanation will thus be complete 
with the identification of the set of circumstances in which the causal powers of objects 
and structures are exercised.  
Following this process, however, presents a real challenge to the researcher. 
Since underlying structures and mechanisms are not directly accessible to sense 
experience, they have to be theoretically constructed and modelled, through a process 
of conceptual abstraction, which critical realists call ‘retroduction’. The retroductive 
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research strategy and design contrasts with the deductive form characteristic of 
positivism and the inductive form typical of constructionism and postmodernism, with 
the objective being to explain – rather than predict, describe or deconstruct – social 
behaviour. Applied to the study of work organizations, for example, the key is to 
uncover why it is that certain persistent relations or features of the organization have 
certain effects or observable outcomes in some settings and not others, and what the 
factors are – for example, management strategy, employee resistance, sector, nation – 
that may explain this. Research strategy thus focuses on the complex interplay between 
social structure and managerial agency over time and place, linking local changes in 
organizational forms and control regimes to deeper structural changes within the 
political economy of capitalism. As Reed (2005) explains, methodologically this requires 
identification and exploration in painstaking detail of each historical case, revealing the 
complex interaction between relevant corporate agents, structural conditions and 
situational contingencies. Ethnography, entailing direct, detailed and sustained contact 
with individuals over time, is ideally suited to facilitating this retroductive process. 
In terms of how a critical realist ethnographer might collect data in a manner that is 
true to their philosophical assumptions about the world, we would expect their 
‘domain-specific ontology’ (Elder-Vass 2010) or ‘scientific ontology’ (Bhaskar 1989) to 
be consistent with the metatheory of transcendental realism. Elder-Vass (2010: 69) 
offers some guidance on how this might be achieved, suggesting that the researcher 
must identify: 
1. the particular types of entities that constitute the objects of the discipline; 
2. the parts of each type of entity and the set of relations between them that are 
required to constitute them into this type of entity; 
3. the emergent properties or causal powers of each type of entity; 
4. the mechanisms through which their parts and the characteristic relations 
between them produce the emergent properties of the wholes; 
5. the morphogenetic causes that bring each type of entity into existence; 
6. the morphostatic causes that sustain their existence; and 
7. the ways that these sort of entities, with these properties, interact to cause the 
events we seek to explain in the discipline. 
 
Successfully compiling this list is no small feat and completing it should perhaps be 
considered the ‘holy grail’ of critical realist social research. These activities are all part 
of the process of data analysis, with steps 5–7 being largely retroductive in nature. But 
these tasks also suggest particular techniques of data collection. For example, to achieve 
steps 1 and 2 the researcher will – as comprehensively as possible – map out the 
qualitatively distinct ontological entities relevant to the domain ontology.  
 The concept of the ‘laminated system’ is useful here (Bhaskar 1993; Elder-Vass 
2010). This is the idea that structures in both the physical and social world are 
morphostatically and emergently made up of many different kinds of entities. For 
example, a biologist might describe the human body as being made up of an 
arrangement of organs, tissues, cells, organelles, molecules, atoms, and so on. These 
ontologically distinct entities can be identified and differentiated through a process of 
reduction and abstraction, but none of these layers can easily be eliminated if the 
biologist wants to understand the causal powers of the human body as a whole. 
Likewise in the social world we might identify organizations or industries as laminated 
systems of interest. In the case of an organization, the management researcher might 
identify relevant entities as human beings, physical buildings, technology and 
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equipment, normative rules, hierarchies, job descriptions, and so on. These entities are 
consistent with the ontological entities of interest to the biologist but they operate at a 
different scale of lamination. In this case it is straightforward enough to differentiate the 
organization and the human body as distinct but related laminated systems, but this is 
not always the case. Using the relevant domain ontologies the critical realist 
ethnographer needs to identify the relevant scale of lamination and then begin 
collecting data on its constituent and emergent entities, parts and relations.  
Whatever kinds of data the critical realist ethnographer collects, they will need 
to begin the retroductive process by filtering this data into themes and categories. There 
are various approaches to doing this (e.g. Spradley 1980; Crinson 2001, 2007; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Crinson (2001) offers some guidance on a useful 
analytical schema, which starts with the coding of qualitative interview and focus group 
data set out in transcript form, after which the issues and ideas raised by respondents 
are interpretatively abstracted into ‘themes’ or conceptual categories, representing the 
perspective of social agents, as would be usual in an orthodox hermeneutic approach. As 
Smith and Elger (2013, this volume) explain, layers of explanation of reality can be 
revealed through an informed and interactive dialogue between interviewers and 
respondents, in which the co-production of knowledge is possible. Subjects construct a 
story of events or actions, which an interviewer can record and challenge but 
fundamentally engage with as a realistic explanation of action.  
These abstracted ‘themes’ represent only the first stage in the retroductive 
process. To leave the analysis at this level, as Crinson (2001) notes, would be adequate 
from a phenomenological perspective (because it is rooted in the actual discourses of 
the respondents), but is insufficient from a critical realist perspective, as it merely 
examines the ‘domain of the actual’ and as such ‘cannot establish the hidden dynamics 
of the multi-relational stratified nature of shared discourse’ (Crinson 2001: 11). Hence 
the next step will be to establish theoretically deduced categories, drawn from the 
literature, which might offer a structural context for the particular discourses. This 
‘theorization’ reflects those hypothesized structural determinants of the discourse of 
social agents. As Smith and Elger (2013, this volume) note, laying bare the reasons for 
action requires bringing in contextual knowledge acquired about a subject from theory 
and ideas. Once again, the problem with leaving the analysis at this ‘theoretical-
deductive’ level would be that it is in essence merely a generalized conceptualization of 
a complex social phenomenon and lacks specificity. Finally, therefore, the process of 
inference (or retroduction) is attempted, in which the conditions for the social 
phenomena under investigation are explained through the postulation of a set of 
generative mechanisms which can account for, and contextualize, the discourses of the 
specific social agents being investigated (Crinson 2001). This interactive process 
searches for connections between subjective interpretations, actual events and deeper 
causal explanations. 
 In the analytical schema developed by Elder-Vass (2010), the first step is to 
categorize data into entities and parts. Table 7.1 sets out one way ethnographers can 
approach this, using a framework provided by Spradley (1980), and we suggest 
illustrative examples of entities relevant to organization studies. 
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Table 7.1  Categories of Ethnographic Data 
 
Categories of data 
(adapted from Spradley 
1980) 
Examples of entities for 
organization studies 
Subject-specific entities 
for teamwork (adapted 
from Gatenby 2008) 
Space (and boundaries) Buildings, local geography Office department layout 
Actors Managers, employees, 
customers 
Chief executive, team 
members, audit inspectors 
Activities (procedures) Work processes and rules Chief executive’s ‘private 
sector practices’, HR 
practices, work tasks 
Physical objects Technology, resources and 
documents 
Computer technology, 
organizational reports 
Language (acts) Face-to-face 
communication, telephone 
calls, emails 
Manager communication, 
briefing emails, group 
discussions 
Events Meetings, away days, lunch 
breaks 
Team meetings, away days, 
quarterly business reviews 
Time Routines and cycles Office routines and audit 
reporting cycles 
Goals Strategies, projects and 
targets 
Organizational 
transformation and 
Performance Indicator 
improvement 
Relationships Line manager–employee Team members, managerial 
relations, inter-team 
relations 
Feelings Satisfaction, commitment, 
fears 
Fear of change, disbelief, 
acquiescence  
Symbols Signs and uniforms Old and new organizational 
culture 
 
This process allows particular subject-specific questions to be examined against 
the wider framework. For example, in a study by the current authors (Gatenby 2008; 
Gatenby and Rees 2011) an intensive period of ethnographic fieldwork observed 
managerial attempts to transform a failing local government authority by introducing 
high commitment work practices, including teamwork. Detailed participant 
observations were conducted for a period of three months across a number of 
workplace settings. Extensive fieldwork diaries were maintained, along with data from 
a series of face-to-face interviews and the collection of local artefacts. The ethnographic 
process revealed the difficulties that managers faced in trying to implement team-based 
quality circles and development meetings at the workplace level. These were analysed 
through a contrast method (Lawson 2009), by identifying entities as either 
morphogenetic forces (leading to transformation of the dynamics within the context, 
and restructuring of the laminated system) or morphostatic forces (which reproduce 
the dynamics of the context, and retain the social structure of the laminated system). 
The ethnographic data allow these entities to be identified and positioned within a 
theoretical framework of multiple determination. Figure 7.1 is an attempt to depict the 
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causal mechanisms interacting with the major ontological entities and parts within the 
research setting. 
 
Figure 7.1  Causal Mechanisms 
 
(adapted from Gatenby 2008) 
 
The analysis suggested that the introduction of teamwork into an office 
environment within the UK civil service is unlikely to lead to changes in behaviour and 
routines if there is little need for task interdependence and employee interaction to 
accomplish work tasks. Employees belonged to departmental ‘teams’ but their work 
activities revolved around individual routines and external requirements. Employees 
did not know what to expect from their fellow team members and their relationships 
involved little peer control. Team members in this context had little past experience of 
using teamwork for their work tasks, their knowledge mainly deriving from new 
strategy documents and their immediate experiences of team ‘away days’. Finally, team 
members had many other opportunities to communicate and interact informally, and 
the team meeting did not offer them anything more in this respect, and so was widely 
perceived as ‘boring’ and/or as merely a more formal version of their normal office 
interactions.  
The subject-specific theory of interdependence (Thompson 1967) suggests that 
for teams to work together the social entities (the people and their relationships) need 
to fit or ‘jointly optimize’ with the technical entities (technology, resources and role-
demands duties, etc.). This was clearly not the case in this particular context. The 
symbolic entities at the organizational level were changed through interventions by the 
new chief executive and individuals representing the Audit Commission, but the social 
and technical entities of the workplace largely remained in place. Because the focus is 
on a specific routine behaviour (i.e. team meeting) it is relatively straightforward to 
identify morphogenetic and morphostatic forces in this case. The morphogenetic forces 
were clearly insufficient to lead to significant change within the workplace setting. The 
study shows the contrast between centralized organizational change through 
‘transformational leadership’ at the organizational level and the morphostatic forces of 
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routines, old rules and symbols, and persistent behaviour at the workplace level. The 
ethnographic data gave access to detailed work routines over time and the episodes of 
morphogenetic interventions. Some changes could be observed in language and 
documents, but physical boundaries, major work tasks, procedural requirements and 
workplace routines and relationships remained very similar. 
 
Critical realist ethnography and organization studies  
 
The study discussed above illustrates how the critical realist focus on process enables a 
view of the organization as a ‘political arena’, in which social interaction, power and 
political manoeuvring become more central in the analysis and understanding of 
organizational life. These processes are in turn shaped by the wider institutional 
context. This linking of micro-level data with abstracted social patterns has been a 
perennial challenge in the social sciences (Barley 2008), and there have been several 
recent calls from organizational scholars to re-examine the value of the structure-
agency dualism and consider critical realism as a potential theoretical advance 
(Edwards 2005; Fleetwood 2005; Reed 2005).   
However, although the explicit adoption of critical realism has until recently 
been relatively rare amongst management and organization scholars, Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood (2000) remind us that philosophical realism has been present, if often 
implicitly, in a wide range of organizational research for some time, and in fact has been 
the orthodoxy in several branches of this broad field over many years. Much of 
institutional theory, labour process analysis, as well as regulationist theory, is 
essentially realist in character. The particular field of industrial relations has a long and 
impressive tradition of materialist and realist-informed research (exemplified by one of 
the editors of this volume – see Edwards 1986, 2005). This research tradition draws on 
the rich streams of Weberian and Marxist social science, where it is acknowledged that 
both social structures (mechanisms, relations, powers, rules, resources, institutions) 
and the meanings that actors and groups attribute to their situation (along with the 
discourse used to convey these meanings) must be taken into account in any full and 
proper explanation of events (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000).  
 There is thus historical depth to current substantive realist research, and 
contemporary applications of critical realism in organization studies are not merely a 
response to, or ‘turn’ away from, postmodernism – or indeed any other philosophical 
position – but rather emerge from specific and well-founded intellectual roots. Much of 
this work (e.g. Delbridge 1998; Taylor and Bain 2004; Elger and Smith 2005) focuses on 
issues concerning the control imperative within managerial capitalism, a casual 
mechanism shaping relationships between managers and workers (Thompson and 
Smith, 2010). As Smith and Elger (2013, this volume) note, control remains central to 
capital-labour relations in capitalism as a system, though it is constantly refashioned for 
new circumstances and in new forms. This highlights the value of comparative case 
studies, which can uncover the varying and complex ways in which combinations of 
structural, historical and operational contingencies interact. Once a mechanism or 
process is identified, generalization from case studies is possible if the same mechanism 
is recognizably operative in many similar situations. As Ackroyd (2009) explains, case 
study accounts of generative processes involve the conceptual interpretation of causal 
sequences, and comparative research can help pin down the way generative 
mechanisms and contexts have intersected historically to produce unique outcomes.  
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As a complement to comparative case studies, critical realist ethnography could 
also usefully be applied to analysing the dynamics of relations and processes within 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), as the current authors have recently argued (Rees 
2009, 2012). Actions such as personal contacts in MNE headquarters-subsidiary 
relations are social events, which take place in the actual domain of reality. Such actions 
or events are observable as experiences in the empirical domain of reality by those who 
experience them and those who study them. Those who experience them are able to 
suggest conditions in which such actions or events occur, that is, reasons, which 
researchers may further examine in terms of objects in the real domain of reality 
(Morais 2011). Sharpe (2004, 2005) outlines the relevance of critical realist 
ethnography to an understanding of practices and processes within the MNE, and 
suggests that in the broad field of international management research the potential for 
ethnographic research has not been fully realized. As she observes, a large amount of 
research on MNEs has used surveys and structured questionnaires to address, for 
example, questions of what employment practices and work systems have been 
transferred from headquarters to subsidiaries within the organization. However, such 
surveys often are pitched at top management and require simply a tick-box 
acknowledgement of whether or not a practice has been transferred, and as such they 
are far less suited to ‘an understanding of how management practices are introduced, 
received, responded to, adapted, resisted or transformed in different contexts’ (Sharpe 
2005: 4). Ethnographic studies can provide a rich appreciation of the MNE as a social 
and political arena, and a critical realist framework provides a means of conceptualizing 
how actors’ experiences within the MNE can best be examined ‘by a macro regress to 
the social structures shaping and constraining individual action’ (Sharpe 2005: 8). 
Critical realist ethnography can therefore illuminate the ‘connective tissue’ between the 
agency of individual managers and workers at the MNE level and the structured context 
of global, national and sector-level constraints.  
If a realist approach to work organizations has been well established over many 
years, this is certainly also the case for explicitly ethnographic studies of work and 
organizational life, which have a fine tradition. In a wide-ranging overview, Hodson 
(2004) finds 204 book-length ethnographies over the last century. Areas receiving the 
most coverage are the manufacturing assembly line, management roles and structures, 
healthcare, and low-skill service work. The earliest studies appear in the 1940s, such as 
Clawson’s (1944) study of shipyard welders and Whyte’s (1948) analysis of human 
relations in the restaurant industry. Classic texts from the post-war period include the 
Boys in White study of a medical school (Becker et al. 1961), the Men Who Manage study 
of managerial work (Dalton 1959), the Banana Time study of work group behaviour 
(Roy 1959), and the On the Shopfloor study of factory life (Lupton 1963). This canon of 
work provided the inspiration for more recent ethnographic research such as 
Collinson’s (1992) shopfloor study, Kunda’s (1992) study of an American high-
technology company, Delbridge’s (1998) study of new manufacturing techniques and 
worker experiences in two factories, Watson’s (2001) account of managerial work in a 
UK telecommunications manufacturing company, Down’s (2006) study of 
entrepreneurship in a small business, and Ho’s (2009) ethnography of Wall Street. 
There have been periodic calls to ‘rediscover’ or reinvigorate the ethnographic 
study of work and organizations, the latest exemplified by the recent launch of the 
Journal of Organizational Ethnography (Brannan et al. 2012). Critical realism provides ‘a 
viable ontology of organizations and management’ (Fleetwood 2004: 49), and in our 
own research we found a realist-informed multi-level analysis to be particularly useful 
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in understanding public sector organizations, illuminating the relative pressures for 
change and/or continuity at different levels (sector, organization and workplace). As 
Kessler et al. (2006) have similarly argued in this context, the theoretical resources 
provided by critical realism, conceiving of social agents as purposeful if constrained 
actors, can be fruitfully combined with an account of negotiation and resistance at the 
workplace level to provide a richer understanding of the dynamics of workplace 
restructuring. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The core argument of this chapter has been that ethnography is most useful when 
located explicitly within a realist framework, utilized not merely as a method of data 
collection but rather as a sociological practice of linking observed accounts to context, 
and explaining rather than merely describing social phenomena. The full value of the 
detailed micro level data gathered through ethnographic studies can only be realized if 
they are situated and interpreted in their historical, economic and social contexts. 
Critical realism is well placed to provide this ‘connective tissue’ and act as an effective 
‘under-labourer’ to ethnographic enquiry.  
Moreover, not only is the ethnographic method strengthened by recourse to 
critical realism, but at the same time we have suggested that critical realists can benefit 
from utilizing ethnographic techniques. As Ackroyd observes, certain forms of data 
collection ‘recommend themselves as ways of gaining insight into causal mechanisms’ 
(2004: 158), and he refers to ethnography and, in particular, participant observation in 
this respect. Ethnography provides a well-established way of clarifying patterns of 
relationships between participants, based upon the sustained observation of behaviour 
to reveal emergent patterns of interaction, and can potentially make a significant 
contribution to the conceptualization of causative mechanisms at the societal level. 
Ethnographic enquiry, if analysed within a realist framework, can thus ‘expand our 
understanding of the interdependence of social structures and social interaction’ 
(Crinson 2001: 2). 
The critical realist emphasis on contextualizing social phenomena by reference 
to social mechanisms operating below the surface and contingent upon specific 
historical, local or institutional contexts is highly resonant of Marx’s (1852) classic 
dictum that ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it … under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past’. Bhaskar expresses this same principle when 
stating that people ‘do not create society …. it always pre-exists them and is a necessary 
condition for their activity … Society does not exist independently of human activity 
(the error of reification). But … [neither is it] the product of it (the error of 
voluntarism)’ (1989: 36). The dynamic relationship between the generative potential 
inherent in social structures and its contingent realization through human agency thus 
stands at the ontological core of critical realism (Fleetwood 2005). 
  Following Banfield (2004), these arguments imply that critical realist 
ethnography will have certain core tenets: (i) it will hold to a stratified emergent 
ontology, with a materialist view of history as its foundation; (ii) it will take structures 
and generative mechanisms as its objects of inquiry; and (iii) it will understand events 
as the outcome of multiple causal processes. We have suggested that, based on these 
philosophical principles, critical realist ethnography will require a particular 
methodological framework, one that enables qualitative data to be integrated into an 
14 
 
analytical process resulting in a concrete conceptualization of a set of interactive 
generative mechanisms. This means moving from specific observations, through 
thematic conceptual categories, and on to a more causal analysis, going beyond the 
micro-interactions of social agents and ‘towards an explanation of the way in which 
social discourses arise out of the interaction between agency and structure in a 
particular material context’ (Crinson 2001: 13).  
Finally, we have briefly considered how critical realist ethnography might 
contribute to the particular area of management and organization studies. Ethnographic 
studies in this area already have a fine tradition of examining the realities of how 
organizations work, continually testing intuitive understandings, challenging 
conventional wisdoms and questioning taken-for-granted or ideologically-grounded 
assumptions (Watson 2011). Critical realist ethnography in particular can help to 
explore beyond and below the surface appearance of organizational strategies and 
practices, something of increasing worth in a field ever more dominated by managerial 
fads and fashions. As Down (2012: 9) observes in the opening volume of the Journal of 
Organizational Ethnography, we should ‘be wary of … expedience and of a fixation on 
the most novel organizational and employment trends’. Critical realism offers 
ethnography the promise of moving beyond a phenomenology of surface appearances, 
insofar as it offers a theory of hierarchical stratification and ontological emergence, 
where organizational ‘reality’ is understood to comprise the concurrent operation of 
multiple mechanisms rooted in, and emergent from, lower ontological strata.  
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